I want to thank my former colleagues. Let me say

first, I am here as a volunteer. I am not retained by anybody.

I am here because I believe in this issue, just as Senator Biden

and Senator Coverdell did when I was in the Senate, and I really

believe that had not the Senate persisted a few years ago we would

not have had the Dayton Accords. We would not have what we

have now in Bosnia, and I really believe it is going to take the

same determination by Members of the Senate of both parties in

a bipartisan way to get some meaningful action now, and it is an honor to be here.

I certainly share the views expressed by my colleague, Senator

D’Amato. He has been there. In fact, he went with me one time.

We had trouble getting in, as I recall.

But 3 years after we have had the Dayton Accords, we have got

the same trouble again with Milosevic, and I know Ambassador

Holbrooke is making every effort to send him a message. In fact,

today, I think, I read on the wire Holbrooke met with some of the

KLA rebels, and he said in effect these people are beleaguered.

They do not have supplies. That is the case in Kosovo. They do not

have the supplies and they are beleaguered.

But we saw what happened—I remember Haris Silajdzic came to

my office before anything even started in Bosnia and he sat in the

Leader’s office and he told me, unless something was done, A, B,

C, D, and E would happen, thousands of people would be killed, innocent

women and children, he gave me a forecast that was almost

perfect, if we did not step in and do something, not just us but NATO and Europe.

So we have seen what happened. We have seen how many refugees

are still trying to find a way back home, whether it is Croatia

or Serbia or Bosnia, mostly in Bosnia.

I happened to be—I have agreed with President Clinton to be

Chairman of the International Commission on Missing Persons.

There are about 20 to 30,000 people who just disappeared in Bosnia;

82 percent are Bosniaks. They are men between the ages of

10 and 70. They were taken from their homes. They were starved

and tortured and executed and dumped into mass graves.

And whenever I go there—and I have been there three times, we

will be going again in July, or August—we meet with the mothers.

And, we all know what the trauma was, for the mothers, after Vietnam

in the United States, and I remember specifically meeting

with a mother in Zagreb, Croatia, because all the mothers had little

buttons, and they had pictures of their sons, missing sons. And

most of these women are peasant women. They are not well-educated.

That is all they have. They do not have any material goods.

All they had were their children, their sons in this case.

I remember coming around to the lady and asking her to tell her

story, and she had a button with four pictures, all of her sons,

taken from their home. She believes they still could be alive. I

think it is highly doubtful.

But like any other mother, she would like us, in our capacity in

trying to locate and identify missing persons’ remains—really, they

are not bodies, but remains, so she can end her grief. So she can

bring some kind of closure to this particular tragedy, that was

started by Milosevic. We do not want to forget where it started.

I used to fuss at the Bush administration because I thought they

sort of gave, maybe not a green light, but it was at least proceed

with caution, but proceed. They did not discourage Milosevic, and

there has not been much discouragement since, and I think it is

fair to say that Senator D’Amato’s already referred to it, Milosevic’s

rise to power was on the tide of extreme nationalism, and it began

in Kosovo, a few years before the war against Bosnia.

I visited Kosovo with Senator D’Amato and Senator Nickles and

Connie Mack and two or three others, and I remember the difficulty

we had getting into Pristina. We were told there were

20,000 people waiting to greet us, just to say hello to Americans,

and they were beaten and driven away by Serb police forces before we could arrive there.

First of all, we were told we could not go there alone without taking

the Serbian foreign minister, and we persisted, and they finally

let us into Pristina, without him. It seemed to me even then it was

pretty obvious there were going to be some big, big problems down the road.

Milosevic was determined to expand power and control through

the use of force and, as you know, he stripped Kosovo of any political

power. Ethnic Albanians cannot operate their own schools. They

must learn Serbian. The Albanians, of course, outnumber the Serbs

by 9 to 1, about 2 million to 180,000 I think it is, but they do not

have their own hospitals, and they deliver babies in a room about

this size, one after another, with no real medical equipment.

I think we understand what has happened. When you strip anybody

of everything they have, their dignity, their power, their autonomy,

and then expect them to be happy, it is not going to last very long.

After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, the Yugoslav

Army, which was under his control, Milosevic’s control, began its

brutal attacks, and 1 year later the Yugoslav Army again supported

Bosnian Serb forces against the Bosnian Government and its citizens.

And here, I want to make a distinction between Milosevic and

the Serbian people. We have all heard about the Serbian mothers

going to Kosovo to try to rescue their sons. In my view, I do not

know whether I would say quite what Senator D’Amato said, because

Milosevic was, I guess, elected president, or at least he is

president, but I do believe that he does not represent the views of most Serbian people.

I found the families in Belgrade, the ones we visited with, had

the same concerns. Their economy was ruined and devastated.

Many Serbs do not have jobs. They do not have opportunities because

of Milosevic, and whenever he gets in trouble he goes down

and starts shooting somebody in Bosnia or Kosovo or somewhere else, to get his numbers up.

But I would just say, with this recent history in mind, it cannot

be a surprise that Milosevic has turned his attention back to

Kosovo. He is using the same bloody tactics and causing the same

human suffering. Unfortunately, what is also the same, is the

hand-wringing and indecisiveness that marked U.S. and Western

policies toward Bosnia until the summer of 1995.

I think it is fair to say that we just have not had strong leadership.

I know the President—in fact, I recently wrote President

Clinton a letter. He sent me a response which I received just a few

days ago. I think he is sincere when he says he wants to bring this

to a stop. He wants to end the violence.

But we have even retreated from the so-called Christmas warnings

which were articulated by both Presidents Bush and Clinton

and advocated that the Kosovar Albanians negotiate with Milosevic

without an international mediator and while attacks were taking

place and, as we all know, that is a fruitless exercise.

So it seems to me that there are several things we might do. The

time for prevention, in my view, has already passed. The opportunity

to resolve the status of Kosovo at Dayton was missed, so

there is no other realistic option left, then, but to threaten

Milosevic with force and be prepared to carry out that threat.

This is the only message that I believe is worth delivering to Belgrade.

I am therefore gravely concerned that the action taken to

date is not enough to prevent another Bosnia, even with NATO jets

only miles away Serb forces continue to lay mines, attack Albanian

villages, and move additional troops and equipment into Kosovo. As

our experience with aggression against Bosnia demonstrated, the

longer we wait to take action the more effort it takes. We either

act now—there have been about 300 killed now, and there are

some missing—or deal with the deadly, much more severe consequences later.

Certainly everyone on this panel has knowledge about this and

may keep more current than I do. But, I would recommend first

that we deliver a real ultimatum to Milosevic—and maybe

Holbrooke will do that when he goes back to Belgrade tomorrow—

but if Milosevic does not halt the attacks on Kosovo, pull back his

forces, and agree to participate in internationally mediated talks,

NATO will conduct air strikes against military installations in Serbia.

Second, establish a NATO no-fly zone over Kosovo which, if violated,

will be met with swift and decisive military retribution.

Third, extend the sanctions imposed on Serbia and establish a

comprehensive economic embargo which includes a ban on the export

of fuel to Serbia. It is imperative, however, that these sanctions

be imposed in conjunction with, rather than as substitute for U.S.-NATO military threat.

Clearly, the objective of these actions is to support a negotiated

solution that will bring a genuine and lasting peace to Kosovo. In

that regard, I would like to discuss the end game for any negotiations.

There has been a lot of discussion to the effect that if we use

force, we will be supporting independence for Kosovo. Mr. Chairman,

I do not take that view. First, in using force, NATO would

be acting to prevent a wider war that could involve Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, among others.

Second, NATO would put Milosevic back in his box and end the violence he has wrought.

Third, NATO would create a more level playing field for negotiations.

Milosevic would never have gone to Dayton if NATO had not

conducted air strikes against Bosnian-Serb targets, at least that is my view.

Finally, in my view, negotiations should be centered on establishing

Kosovo as a republic with the same status as Serbia and Montenegro

and with international guarantees. I believe that the

Kosovar leadership would support such a solution. In fact, I think

there is a willingness on the part of the Kosovar leadership to come

to the table in some internationally mediated negotiation.

For nearly 10 years, while under increasing repression, President

Rugova and Prime Minister Bukoshi have supported a moderate

approach and rejected force to achieve their political aims. Now

under attack in a real war situation the ethnic Albanians they represent,

have lost their patience, and some not surprisingly have

supported the Kosovo Liberation Army, the KLA.

If NATO acts resolutely, this will not only bring Milosevic to the

table, but it will also bolster the credibility of Rugova and Bukoshi

among the people who elected them.

I would conclude by asking that my entire statement be made a

part of the record. I am certain that you have heard much of this

before, but I want to make one last statement, and that is about

humanitarian aid. I have just been advised that the International

Committee on the Red Cross has been very active in that area. It

is critical that the United States provide logistical and material

support to the humanitarian aid effort and do all it can to ease the

suffering of the Kosovars.

Tens of thousands who have been forced out of their homes have

fled in fear. They lack food. They lack medicine.

I met with some of the women who were here from Kosovo, as

you may have. I met with them this morning, and the stories they

tell you are almost unreal. You cannot believe it, but you do believe

it because you know it is the truth about the suffering that is happening in all of Kosovo.

Unless we address the real problem, and the real problem is

Milosevic’s genocidal expansionist regime, we will condemn ourselves

to the costly mistakes of Western delay and inaction in Bosnia.

And again, whether we like it or not, we have to provide the

leadership. I must say Prime Minister Blair has been very forthcoming

in his statements, and the statement just again today, saying

the military option is still on the table. I believe that with our

leadership we could probably end this crisis and end this reign of terror.

I also want to thank Senator Tim Johnson for contacting me and

indicating that he is in the process of trying to round up some Senate

support for a resolution he has introduced.

So, Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues, I thank you very much,

and I know you understand the importance of this. There are many

people in this room who come from Kosovo who now live in the

United States. They understand the importance of this, and I have

confidence the Senate will do whatever it takes to do the appropriate thing.

Well, first it would be—I would not say precedentsetting,

but it would be refreshing to find France on the same side.

That would be news, and that would be welcome.

But you know, we have the Russians as members of the Security

Council and, of course, obviously they have a close relationship

with the Serbs and Slavic nations, and I know Milosevic made the

trek to see Yeltsin and others in Russia recently. We may want to

go get a resolution of some kind, but it seems to me we have that authority.

I do not think—I mean, we can delay this. That is one way to

delay it, is to go back to the United Nations and wait another 30

or 60 days, and I assume maybe after Holbrooke leaves that

Milosevic will be a good boy for a while and then in a couple of

weeks something else will happen and he will start his terror again

in Kosovo, but I am not certain I would agree with the French Prime Minister.

Well, it would be great—you know, we thought for

a long time this was something the Europeans could handle, but

as it turned out it again took our efforts and our leadership. I commend

the administration for the efforts in Dayton, but I think they

came far too late. As I said, I think the Bush administration was

also gujilty of delaying and withholding action. They wanted to

keep an undivided Yugoslavia, which was not even practical, because

it already had a declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia.

I think we have to provide the leadership, and I would hope that

President Clinton understands that. I think it is a question of how

is he going to get support. I think he has support from Tony Blair,

but Milosevic has been through this dozens of times, and he is familiar

with all the tough rhetoric. He has heard it all. If nothing

happens afterwards, he is going to keep doing it.

That is why I think it is important, and maybe

Ambassador Abramowitz has a different view, that we do everything

that we can now to stop Milosevic. if you have mediated negotiations

and have the Serbs pull out, and the KLA would have

no choice but to continue to defend their people. And I would assume

there are some KLA membes who are, while I would not say

terrorists, are capable of terrorist-style acts. Maybe a few.

Meanwhile, because we have not stopped Milosevic, the KLA continues

to grow. But if somebody has got to protect your home and

you have got an invading force, and you do not belong to the KLA

or any other group, you are probably going to sign up. You are

going to join up, and that is what is happening.

And the longer we wait, the longer the international community

waits to take some action, the more of this you are going to have.

Who wants anyone killed, Serb or Albanian? I do not know of anybody

who is wishing for that, certainly not young boys, and I happened

to see that picture in the *New York Times*, the 13-year-old.

But it is going to increase, as you indicated, unless some action is taken.

I do not think it will happen, and I remember

when we got 69 votes to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. That was

enough to override a veto, and then things started to happen, but

not until then. And, the effort was, as you know, totally bipartisan.

I remember some people were sort of slow coming in that direction,

but once they had been there and seen what was happening, they

were supportive. I think it gave President Clinton support. He needed the support.

I would just add, it seems to me Milosevic understands

the U.S. Senate, and he knows there are 100 Members.

When you get to have 60 or 70 on one side or the other, he understands that, so I think that helps.

My view is that he is a very charming person to sit down with,

and you say, well, stay for lunch, or stay for dinner, or stay all

night, or stay all week. When you meet Tudjman, Milosevic is sort

of the charmer of the group, because he wants to get rid of sanctions.

I was there in January and he said, well, 2 years is long enough.

There have been sanctions long enough. I said, well, what about

Kosovo? Oh, we are making great progress in Kosovo. I am going

to announce a big educational program.

And weeks later we had the first people killed. You cannot trust him.

I would just say briefly that—and you are right,

we cannot kick every sleeping dog. We cannot just go around the

world and say, well, here is a problem, let us take care of it on our own.

But I think there is a larger question here, and my view is that

as this continues to escalate what we have going in Bosnia is going

to fall apart. I mean, if we cannot control the Serbian police in

Kosovo I look for something to erupt in Bosnia where we now have

at least peace as long as we are there, as long as Americans are

there. Thirty four other nations are also participating. For that reason I think there is a direct link.

And it was my view from the start we would not be in that part

of the world today had we lifted the arms embargo years ago, as

you voted to do, and as we all voted to do, because the Bosnians

could have fought their own battles. I mean, there is a right of selfdefense.

It is guaranteed in the United Nations charter, but we

would not give the Bosnians that right, and now we are paying for it, billions and billions of dollars.

American forces have been there a couple of years, and I think

they should continue to stay for a while, maybe reduce their numbers.

I think this is the legacy of that nonpolicy that stated back

in the early nineties and continued until, again, the U.S. Senate

spoke with some authority with 69 votes.

So I think I would make an exception in this case and ensure

that the United States stands up and takes effective action. If this

continued to spread too to Montenegro and to other countries, Albania,

who knows where, it might end in a greater conflict. I think

it is again a part of the problem that we did not resolve properly

in the first place in Yugoslavia, and it is still there to be dealt with,

and I think we have to finish it. If it is up to us to do it alone, we have to finish it.

That is the point I tried to make. Of course, Albania

is probably the poorest country in that part of the world, but

there are a lot of refugees are fleeing there. I am not certain they

are going to have the resources to take care of them, but they are able to provide weapons.

And, of course, Iran is looking at this very carefully, and other

countries that we have some interest in, but you look at the map

and you have got Montenegro and Albania, you have got Macedonia

and Greece and Turkey, and pretty soon you have got a big, big problem.

I think the ripple effect, in my view it is not based on any super

knowledge, but it just seems to me, having been there several

times, if the Serbs get away with this in Kosovo, what is going to

happen in Bosnia again, where they have lost 250,000 women and

children for the most part. I wish Milosevic would listen, but I

think he has got a hearing problem. He does not hear anything. He

is—like Senator Biden indicated, he keeps you there for 3 hours

and you talk to him directly, and it is just like water off a duck, and then he gets ready for the next visitor.

There may be some way to do it, but I think one way—and again,

Ambassador Abramowitz is going to touch on that, and that is mediation.

But this means genuine negotiations, with a credible

threat of force, and U.S. leadership as a firm mediator. But it is

going to be up to us to provide the leadership, and it starts right here in the U.S. Senate.

That is my view. We worked hours and hours

with a lot of people involved in the resolutions we crafted, and the

more we made it specific, the more we talked about lifting the arms

embargo, which made a lot of sense to a lot of people, regardless

of party or philosophy, then I think we were on the right track.

I think the others may serve some purpose, but I think if we are

really serious about it there ought to be a concerted effort to say,

OK, let us really work on a real resolution. Let us bring that up

in a bipartisan way and get a good vote for it and give the President support.